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Kachin Conflict 
I. Overview 
On 30 May 2013, the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) signed a tentative 
peace agreement with the Myanmar government – the last of the eleven major eth-
nic armed groups to do so since 2011. This represents a major opportunity to secure 
lasting peace in Kachin State, and in the country as a whole. Yet, there will be signifi-
cant challenges in doing so. Key issues still need to be discussed and agreed, including 
the repositioning of troops from both sides to reduce the chance of clashes, a moni-
toring mechanism, and a meaningful political dialogue. Major steps need to be taken 
to develop an equitable peace economy, and the exploitation of Kachin’s significant 
natural resources, if not appropriately regulated, could compound inequalities and 
trigger renewed conflict. Much remains to be done to avoid a repeat of the failures of 
the previous ceasefire process.  
The Kachin conflict is one of the longest-running ethnic insurgencies in Myanmar 
and in the world. A rugged and independent hill people, the Kachin had played a key 
role in the allied victory over Japanese forces in northern Myanmar during the Sec-
ond World War, and were a central part of the post-independence military. After 
these troops rebelled, the KIO quickly became among the largest and most formida-
ble of the ethnic armed groups. 
In 1994, the KIO reached a ceasefire agreement with the then-military govern-
ment and participated in the deeply flawed National Convention process that ended 
with the drafting of the 2008 constitution. The KIO was allowed no substantive 
input, however, and no real discussion of ethnic grievances was possible. In the lead-
up to the 2010 elections, the regime reneged on earlier promises to the KIO, demand-
ing that they transform into border guard units under the partial control of the 
Myanmar army. When the KIO refused to do so, the ceasefire was declared void, and 
the electoral commission prevented registration of the main Kachin political parties 
and independent candidates. 
In mid-2011, shortly after power was transferred to the new government, armed 
conflict in Kachin reignited. Numerous rounds of peace talks failed to achieve a break-
through, and in late 2012 the conflict escalated once more. The prospects for peace 
looked grim. 
It was a firm intervention from China, worried about border stability and security 
and its major investment projects in the area that brought the two sides back to the 
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negotiating table in February 2013. After two rounds of talks in China, there was 
once again deadlock, this time because Beijing objected to the presence of other 
international observers – the U.S., UK and UN – who had been invited by the KIO. 
The deadlock lasted more than two months, and a compromise was only reached 
after increasing resentment in Myanmar over what was perceived to be an unhelpful 
Chinese position. 
The compromise was that the next talks, held from 28-30 May 2013 in the Kachin 
State capital Myitkyina, would have the UN and China as the international observ-
ers, but no-one else. These talks – held for the first time in government-controlled 
territory – resulted in a breakthrough. A seven-point peace agreement was signed, 
referencing longstanding demands of the KIO on the need for force separation, a 
monitoring and verification mechanism, and a dialogue on political issues. 
This is a major step forward. Securing a sustainable peace will not be easy, and 
depends on more detailed negotiations in these three areas. The 30 May agreement 
is the beginning of a process of consolidating peace, not the end. Without further 
progress, a resumption of armed conflict is possible. 
Access to displaced people for provision of humanitarian assistance is vital. It is 
also critical to address the longer-term development needs of Kachin communities. 
This will require donor support, but most importantly, it requires a shift in Kachin 
areas – from the present conflict economy to one that provides broad benefits to Kachin 
State and its peoples. Managing the state’s valuable natural resources in a sustain-
able and equitable way – including billions of dollars of jade production annually – 
will be key. 
II. Background to the Conflict 
A. Historical Legacy  
Myanmar is home to the majority Burman people,1 who make up perhaps two thirds 
of the population, together with a large number of other ethnic groups, many of 
whom live in the mountainous borderlands, comprising around one third of the 
population. Numbers are contested and no comprehensive census of the whole coun-
try and its ethnic composition has been conducted since colonial times.2 
The borderlands that constitute the country’s remote and rugged periphery have 
never been fully under the control of the central state. The different ethnic groups 
thus remained relatively distinct from each other in language, culture, economy and 
political traditions. British colonisation in the nineteenth century reinforced these 
divisions. The central part of the country, known as “Ministerial Burma”, was placed 
under direct rule, and subject to colonial legal and administrative authority. The 
borderlands, known as the “Frontier Areas”, were administered separately and left 
largely under the authority of hereditary chiefs. This division effectively hindered 
 
 
1 “Burman” (or “Bamar”) denotes the majority ethnic group in Myanmar, whereas “Burmese” (or 
“Myanma”) denotes all people of the country. For previous Crisis Group reporting on Myanmar 
since the present government took power, see Crisis Group Asia Briefings N°136, Reform in My-
anmar: One Year On, 11 April 2012 and N°127, Myanmar: Major Reform Underway, 22 Septem-
ber 2011; and Asia Reports N°238, Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon, 12 November 2012; 
N°231, Myanmar: The Politics of Economic Reform, 27 July 2012 and N°214, Myanmar: A New 
Peace Initiative, 30 November 2011. 
2 A new census, which will collect data on ethnicity, is planned for 2014. 
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Burman-minority interaction and relations were further undermined when the British 
recruited mainly Chin, Kachin and Karen into the colonial army, rather than Burmans. 
Many from these ethnic groups also converted to Christianity during this period. 
During the Second World War, Burman nationalists sided briefly with the Japa-
nese to fight against colonialism and achieve independence, then later switched 
sides to support the Allies. Most ethnic minority forces remained loyal to the British 
throughout, and at various times Burman and ethnic minority troops fought each 
other. There were many reports of brutal retribution by Burman forces against ethnic 
communities.3 By the time of post-war discussions on the shape of a future inde-
pendent country, there were already serious tensions between the majority Burmans 
and ethnic minorities. 
At the 1947 Panglong Conference, Shan, Kachin and Chin representatives from 
the Frontier Areas agreed to the formation of a Union of Burma in return for prom-
ises of full autonomy in internal administration and an equal share in the country’s 
wealth. The Karen – one of the largest minorities – did not participate in these nego-
tiations, sending only an observer team. There were strong critics also among other 
ethnic groups. The 1947 constitution, which came into force after independence the 
following year, deepened the divides, in particular its provisions for power sharing 
between the centre and various ethnic states, which were the result of hasty, fragile 
and inconsistent compromises with ethnic leaders. The powers and degree of auton-
omy delegated to the ethnic states varied considerably or, in the case of the Karen, 
were unresolved. No special provisions were made for a number of major groups (such 
as the Mon, Rakhine and Wa). The upshot was that several ethnic rebellions had 
begun to simmer even before independence, and post-independence Burma was 
thrown into chaos. 
The first major group to go underground, three months after independence in 
1948, was the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Soon after, Karen, Mon, Karenni 
(Kayah), Pao, Rakhine and “Mujahid” Rohingya nationalists also rebelled, due to the 
minimal input they had been allowed to have on the shape of the new country, and 
in particular dissatisfaction with the rights of self-determination provided for them 
in the constitution. 
Other ethnic minority groups, including the Kachin, initially rallied around the 
government. The Kachin and Chin Rifles – key units of the national army – were 
deployed against the rebellious communist and Karen forces and may have been in-
strumental in preventing the break-up of the country. During the late 1950s and early 
1960s, however, the Chin and Kachin, along with the Shan, also rebelled as dissatis-
faction grew with an increasingly centralised form of government in Rangoon that 
they felt was ignoring ethnic interests. This was a turning point, as these three groups 
had signed the Panglong agreement and had been loyal to the concept of a union. 
The 1962 military coup, ostensibly a move to prevent the country from breaking up, 
provided added impetus to rebellion. Decades of conflict followed. 
B. The Kachin Struggle 
The term “Kachin” refers to diverse subgroups inhabiting Kachin State and neigh-
bouring areas of Myanmar, China and India. Some of these groups are only distantly 
related. The major group, known as the “Jingphaw” in Myanmar (and as “Jingpho” 
 
 
3 See Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (Zed Books, 1999), 2nd edi-
tion, p. 62. 
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in China and “Singpho” in India), has long been politically dominant, and there have 
sometimes been tensions between it and other Kachin groups, the Rawang, Lisu, 
Lashi, Maru and Azi. 
The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) was established in February 1961 
by a group of young Kachin nationalists who felt that the promises of political auton-
omy made at the Panglong conference had not been honoured. It quickly grew to be-
come one of the largest and best-organised armed opposition groups in the country, 
controlling large areas of Kachin and northern Shan states. Ceasefire discussions 
took place at various points with the government, the most significant of which was 
in the early 1980s, with KIO leader Brang Seng travelling to Yangon at one point, but 
ultimately no deal was struck. 
Over the years, like many armed groups, the KIO has suffered from fragmenta-
tion and splits. These were due to a number of factors, including personal rivalries, 
ideological differences and intra-ethnic tensions, sometimes with the encouragement 
or support of the government. In 1968, a prominent Maru, Ting Ying, defected from 
the KIO along with several hundred Lashi and Maru fighters. This group affiliated 
itself with the insurgent Communist Party of Burma (CPB), as Unit 101. When the 
CPB began imploding in 1989, as a result of a series of mutinies by ethnic minority 
troops against its Burman leadership, Ting Ying’s group restyled itself as the New 
Democratic Army-Kachin (NDAK) and reached a ceasefire agreement with the gov-
ernment, as did most of the other ethnic minority organisations to emerge from the 
collapse of the CPB. 
The KIO itself continued fighting. Yet, faced with the enormous human costs of 
the conflict, its leadership had become convinced that a negotiated political solution 
had to be found. It took the initiative to open contacts with the government in the 
early 1990s, aiming to negotiate a nationwide ceasefire on behalf of all armed oppo-
sition groups, to be followed by political dialogue. But unity between the groups soon 
broke down, and the KIO, unable to convince its other ethnic allies to enter dialogue 
with the government, signed its own agreement in early 1994. Several other groups, 
including the New Mon State Party (NMSP), soon followed. This left the Shan State 
Army-South and the Karen National Union (KNU) as the main groups still in armed 
rebellion. (These groups agreed ceasefires in December 2011 and January 2012, 
respectively.) 
III. The 1994 Ceasefire: An Uneasy Peace 
A. A Problematic Ceasefire 
The 1994 ceasefire ended the armed conflict in Kachin areas but did not address the 
underlying grievances. The expectation of the KIO was that its peace deal would pave 
the way for a nationwide ceasefire and a national dialogue about a broader political 
solution to the civil war. This was not to be. The continued fighting between the gov-
ernment and Shan and Karen groups meant that a national ceasefire remained elu-
sive, and the government rejected calls for a political dialogue with the KIO. 
Kachin politics also changed in important ways following the ceasefire. The death 
of the KIO’s influential and respected leader, Brang Seng, a few months later repre-
sented a major blow. At the same time, a shift from a war footing to a peace economy 
created challenges. The KIO took formal administrative authority over the territory 
under its control and it functioned in many respects as a local government – with 
departments of health, education, agriculture, and so on; running civilian hospitals 
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and schools (that taught Kachin language and culture); and initiating infrastructure 
projects. It also maintained its armed forces. 
The organisation funded its operations mainly through business activities, in-
cluding in the lucrative areas of jade and gold mining, and logging. As time went on, 
there were increasing complaints from communities and civic groups over the lack of 
transparency of these resource revenues and the fact that very few were being used for 
the welfare of the population. The ceasefire also provided the space for outside busi-
ness interests to enter Kachin State and become involved in unsustainable resource 
extraction activities. 
In 2001, KIO leader Zau Mai and two other senior members were ousted by 
younger officers. Officially, Zau Mai was replaced because of health problems, but 
the real reason seems to have been dissatisfaction over his family’s business dealings 
and the wealth they were amassing, as well as his autocratic leadership style.4 
The new leadership seemed committed to pushing forward the Kachin political 
cause, but faced many of the same constraints – the need for financial survival, per-
ceptions of corruption, the difficulty of dealing with a regime that was not ready to 
engage in substantive political dialogue, and increasing disaffection of the Kachin 
population and in particular the youth with the ceasefire.5 
B. A Failed Political Process 
The Kachin peace deal, like all the ceasefires of the late 1980s and 1990s, was a secu-
rity agreement: a truce, not a political settlement. The text was short, stating that 
there would be peace between the two sides, followed by development and economic 
improvements in Kachin areas and efforts to promote national peace. Liaison offices 
were established to ensure close communication, and KIO troop deployments and 
territories were specified.6 
While the written agreement dealt only with military matters, the discussions 
themselves had been more wide-ranging. The military government always maintained 
that it was an interim administration and therefore not able to reach agreement on 
political matters. Instead, it laid out a “political roadmap”, providing for a National 
Convention to draft a new constitution, to which the ceasefire groups and the politi-
cal opposition were invited to send delegates, to be followed by a referendum and 
elections. 
The KIO agreed to participate in the roadmap, as it was convinced that in order to 
further its aims, it had to be part of the national political process, rather than fighting 
in the hills and excluded from it.7 Following the ceasefire, it attended the National 
Convention, which had begun the previous year. Although the ethnic minority dele-
gates were unable to have any significant influence on proceedings, the KIO attend-
ed the convention until it ended in 2007. That year, the organisation submitted to 
the chairman of the convention a nineteen-point proposal for the inclusion of certain 
 
 
4 See, for example, Ashley South, Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Shel-
drake (Routledge, 2003). 
5 Crisis Group interview, analyst, Yangon, May 2013. 
6 “Agreement between government peacemaking group representatives and KIO representatives”, 
24 February 1994. Of all the ceasefires reached during this period, the Kachin were the only group 
to have a written agreement, which they obtained only after much insistence and on the condition 
that they would keep the text secret. 
7 See the comments of the then-KIO chairman, Brang Seng, reported in Martin Smith, op. cit., pp. 
442-443. 
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provisions in the future constitution, but it was not discussed in the convention, and 
the KIO received no response from the authorities.8 A similar proposal, jointly sub-
mitted by thirteen ceasefire groups at an earlier stage of the National Convention, 
had also been ignored. 
Despite its failure to have any influence over the National Convention process 
and outcome, the KIO maintained a fairly cooperative stance. After initially instruct-
ing its members and their families to boycott the constitutional referendum, it told 
them to vote in favour, and advised the public to do likewise.9 The military govern-
ment had been extremely concerned that the KIO would take a stand against the ref-
erendum and constitution and had sent several envoys to urge it not to do so. In the 
subsequent election process, the KIO went very far in adhering to the requirements 
of the constitution and electoral legislation. Yet, in spite of this, it faced military 
pressure and Kachin political representatives were then locked out of the elections. 
C. Political Crisis 
In addition to their more general concerns over the 2008 constitution and that their 
proposals had not been incorporated, several ethnic armed groups were uncomfort-
able with one clause that appeared to prohibit them from retaining arms. Section 338 
of the constitution reads: “all the armed forces in the Union shall be under the com-
mand of the Defence Services”. Top regime officials had told the KIO and other cease-
fire groups that they should discuss conditions for giving up their arms only once the 
new government was in place.10 The groups had been assured that the authorities 
would not require that they give up their arms in the interim, and it was on this basis 
that the KIO agreed to participate in the 2008 constitutional referendum. 
Those promises proved to be empty. In April 2009, the regime issued a new in-
struction, detailing how ceasefire groups should transform their armed units into 
“Border Guard Forces” under the partial command of the Myanmar military.11 The 
transition process was to begin immediately.  
Such a move was of considerable concern to ceasefire groups; it would greatly re-
duce their autonomy and would represent a major concession in return for which 
they were being offered no political quid pro quo by the regime. None of the major 
ceasefire groups – with the exception of the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army – 
agreed to follow the instruction. The KIO held discussions with the regime, express-
ing its concern about some aspects (including the “border” designation), indicating 
that it would have to hold extensive consultations with its communities before it 
could give a final response, and stressing that any such transformation would be long 
and complicated.12 While the government saw the border guard scheme as the price 
of entry to the elections, KIO leaders were surprised and deeply unhappy that having 
cooperated with all stages of the government’s roadmap this demand had suddenly 
been imposed on them with no prior discussion. Moreover, the provisions of the 
 
 
8 “The KIO proposal for constitutional provisions and clauses”, KIO Central Committee, July 2007. 
9 Crisis Group interview, KIO leader, Yunnan, February 2009; “KIO no longer neutral on stand over 
referendum”, Kachin News Group, 9 May 2008. 
10 Crisis Group interviews, Bangkok and Yunnan, January-February 2009. 
11 The instruction, dated 28 April 2009 and consisting of several pages of text, but with no official 
title or seal, is on file with Crisis Group. 
12 Crisis Group interview, KIO leader, Yunnan, February 2009. 
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scheme were seen as unworkable and in contradiction with the assurances they had 
been given when they signed the ceasefire.13 
As several deadlines to adopt the scheme came and went, the regime stepped up 
pressure on the KIO and other ceasefire groups. It frustrated attempts by Kachin 
leaders to form a political party to contest the 2010 elections, on the basis of a provi-
sion of the political party registration law prohibiting parties from having contacts 
with organisations “in revolt with arms against the state”.14 
Taking this provision into consideration, the KIO’s vice-chairman, Dr Tu Ja, 
resigned from the organisation when he decided to lead a Kachin political party, the 
Kachin State Progressive Party, which aimed to represent all ethnic communities in 
Kachin State. The party had strong support in Kachin areas, and planned to contest 
the majority of seats in the state. It was denied registration by the Myanmar Election 
Commission. Similarly, a party representing the Kachin areas of northern Shan 
State, the Northern Shan State Progressive Party, was also denied registration. It be-
came clear to the KIO that registration was contingent on it accepting the border 
guard scheme. The Election Commission sent a clear signal to the Kachin parties that, 
should the KIO adopt a different stance, their registration process could proceed 
quickly: another ceasefire group, the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army, agreed to 
the Border Guard Force proposal in July 2010, and its associated political party was 
then ushered through the registration process in record time.15 
Dr Tu Ja and other leaders of the unregistered Kachin State Progressive Party 
subsequently tried to register as independent candidates, but this was also blocked 
by the Election Commission. This meant that there was effectively no independent 
political representation for the Kachin people in the election,16 leading to widespread 
anger and disillusionment among the Kachin population. 
IV. A Return to War 
A. Tensions Boil Over 
Following the elections, the scene was set for a resumption of hostilities. In late 2010, 
tensions increased after the regime took a series of confrontational steps toward the 
KIO: in addition to the refusal to register the Kachin political parties, the regime 
declared the ceasefire “null and void”, ordered the closure of KIO liaison offices, 
applied economic pressure by blocking KIO trading routes, and began referring to 
the organisation as “insurgents” in the state media.17 
In February 2011, there was a serious incident in which the KIO shot and killed a 
Myanmar army battalion commander after he led his troops into a KIO-controlled 
area unannounced. Escalation was avoided, with the army apparently determining 
 
 
13 Ibid. 
14 Section 12(a)(iii) of the 2010 Political Parties Registration Law, which repeated a provision (sec-
tion 407b) of the 2008 constitution. 
15 The Kayin State Democracy and Development Party lodged its initial application on 11 August, it 
was approved by the Election Commission the following day, and final registration was completed 
on 19 August. 
16 The only Kachin party to stand was the Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State, an offshoot 
of the military government’s Union Solidarity and Development Party. 
17 For a contemporaneous account, see “A changing ethnic landscape: Analysis of Burma’s 2010 
polls”, Transnational Institute/Burma Centrum Nederland, Burma Policy Briefing No. 4, December 
2010. 
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that its troops had acted improperly.18 Tensions were simmering at the time that 
power was transferred to the new semi-civilian government of President Thein Sein 
at the end of March 2011 and both sides were aware that a resumption of fighting 
was a real possibility.19 
The flashpoint came on 9 June 2011, with clashes between government troops 
and the strategic KIO outpost of Bumsen in Kachin State – close to the site of two 
Chinese-operated hydroelectric dams at Tarpein. The same day, soldiers arrested 
and killed a KIO representative from its nearby liaison office. The organisation alleged 
that his corpse showed evidence of severe torture. The Myanmar army overran the 
outpost on 12 June, and when it ignored a KIO deadline to withdraw, the KIO placed 
all its troops on a war footing and destroyed a number of bridges in the area to ham-
per the resupply of government forces. 
From then until January 2013, clashes occurred regularly in several parts of Kachin 
and northern Shan states. There are allegations during this period of serious human 
rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, particularly (but not 
exclusively) on the part of government forces.20 The fighting has displaced some 
100,000 civilians.21 
B. A Chronology of Talks 
In the first weeks following the resumption of the conflict, two rounds of peace talks 
were held between the KIO and a team from the Kachin State government on 30 
June and 1 August 2011. The KIO indicated that it was not ready to sign a new cease-
fire without neutral witnesses and a public commitment from the government to 
starting a political dialogue with all groups. As a KIO leader put it, “to have political 
discussions as a single organisation is meaningless; the ethnic issue is a nationwide 
issue”.22 
After initial discussions with the local government failed to make headway, a na-
tional negotiation team started direct talks. At that time, two separate teams were con-
ducting peace talks with the various armed groups in the country: one drawn from 
the legislature, headed by lower house representative Aung Thaung; and another 
from the executive, headed by then-Railways Minister Aung Min (now one of the 
“super ministers” in the president’s office). Aung Min had responsibility for negotia-
tions with armed groups in lower Myanmar, and Aung Thaung for upper Myanmar, 
including Kachin. 
This was to prove unfortunate. Aung Thaung, widely seen as a hardliner, had a 
poor reputation with the KIO. He had been the person charged by General Than Shwe 
 
 
18 Crisis Group interview, Kachin community leader, Myanmar, April 2011; see also Wai Moe, “Bur-
mese officer killed in clash with KIA”, The Irrawaddy, 7 February 2011. 
19 See, for example, “Burma’s new government: prospects for governance and peace in ethnic 
states”, Transnational Institute/Burma Centrum Nederland, Burma Policy Briefing no. 6, May 2011. 
20 Crisis Group interviews, KIO leaders, Laiza, October 2011; see also “Untold miseries: Wartime 
abuses and forced displacement in Burma’s Kachin State”, Human Rights Watch, March 2012. 
21 There are over 85,000 registered internally displaced persons (IDPs) in government- and KIO-
controlled areas, and an estimated 10,000-15,000 living with host families. Myanmar Humanitari-
an Bulletin, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 18 April to 31 May 
2013 and Crisis Group interview, UNOCHA official, Yangon, June 2013. 
22 Crisis Group interview, a KIO military commander, Laiza, October 2011. 
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in 2010 with delivering the ultimatum to the KIO to join the border guard scheme.23 
In negotiations, he showed little flexibility or readiness to make concessions, includ-
ing on the locations for talks.24 Even the president’s decision at the end of September 
2011 to cancel construction of the Myitsone dam in Kachin State, a project that the 
KIO and Kachin community were vehemently opposed to, did not create traction in 
the peace talks. 
On 10 December 2011, the president called a unilateral halt to offensive actions 
against the KIO, in what was presented as an effort to build confidence for peace 
talks. However, armed clashes continued, with each side blaming the other, and deep 
bitterness resulting from the intense, and often bloody, conflict. 
By late March 2012, with little progress being made in the KIO negotiations despite 
several rounds of meetings,25 President Thein Sein changed negotiators, putting 
Railways Minister Aung Min in charge of the Kachin peace talks. This change was 
formalised on 3 May, through the establishment of a national peace committee 
chaired by the president himself, with a working committee that included members 
from the two previous negotiation teams, but not Aung Thaung.26 Aung Min was one 
of the vice chairs of the working committee and in practice took over day-to-day 
charge of the peace processes. 
Aung Min held a first informal meeting with two KIO leaders on 21 May 2012, in 
the northern Thai city of Chiang Rai. He expressed a willingness to come to KIO ter-
ritory for the next meeting, something Aung Thaung had never been ready to con-
sider.27 This led to a second meeting in the KIO-held town of Maijayang near the 
Chinese border, from 31 May to 1 June. To reach Maijayang, Aung Min and his team 
had to travel by road through Kachin State, across the front lines of the conflict.28 
This logistically complicated feat was facilitated by a group of Kachin businessmen 
known as the Kachin Peace Talk Creation Group, headed by influential jade trader 
Yup Zau Hkawng.29 Aung Min taking the trouble, and the risk, to come to a KIO area 
helped to break the ice, and the atmosphere was positive.30 Following on from this, 
another meeting was held in Maijayang on 21 June 2012. 
But after these initial informal and confidence-building meetings, the talks be-
came bogged down in disagreements over the location of the next meeting and due 
to lack of mutual trust. The location was eventually resolved in favour of the Chinese 
border town of Ruili, and a further meeting was scheduled between Aung Min and 
the KIO on 30 October 2012. This meeting turned out to be a disaster. On the agenda 
was supposed to be a discussion of military positions and separation of forces, in 
order to reduce tensions and minimise the potential for clashes. According to individ-
uals closely involved, Aung Min had put a great deal of effort into securing high-level 
participation by the Myanmar military, which was ready to withdraw from several of 
 
 
23 Another senior member of Aung Thaung’s team, Thein Zaw, was similarly distrusted, as he had 
been the one to push the KIO to support the 2008 constitutional referendum, assuring them that 
they would not have to disarm prior to the elections. 
24 Crisis Group interview, individual close to the peace process, Yangon, March 2013. 
25 Meetings between Aung Thaung and the KIO were held on 29 November 2011, 18-19 January and 
8-10 March 2012, all in the Chinese town of Ruili near the Myanmar border. 
26 Myanmar President Office orders 11/2012 and 12/2012, 3 May 2012 (published in New Light of 
Myanmar, 19 May 2012, p. 1). 
27 Crisis Group interview, individual close to the peace process, Yangon, March 2013. 
28 Crisis Group interviews, individuals present at the talks, Bangkok, June 2012. 
29 The group has a website (www.peace-talkcreationgroup.com) explaining its activities. 
30 Crisis Group interviews, individuals present at the talks, Bangkok, June 2012. 
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its positions in Kachin State as part of a force-separation agreement.31 In what was 
interpreted by the government as a snub, none of the senior leaders of the KIO came 
to the meeting, prompting the Myanmar military to downgrade its level of partici-
pation. No discussions on force separation could take place, and Aung Min was left 
feeling seriously undermined.32 
There are competing explanations about what caused this problem. The KIO says 
that a detailed agenda and information on who would be participating in the meet-
ing were not shared in advance, so it had not been aware that discussions on force 
separation would take place. It also claims that there were significant attacks on 
some of its positions by the Myanmar military in the days leading up to the talks, 
meaning its military leaders were too busy to travel.33 Alternatively, some observers 
believe that the KIO had not reached an internal consensus about agreeing to a sepa-
ration of forces.34 Whatever the reasons, two things seem clear: first, the government 
side failed to convey to the KIO how much effort had been put into convincing the 
Myanmar military to seriously consider the force separation issue and discuss this at 
the meeting; and second, the KIO made a major miscalculation by not sending a sen-
ior leader. The result was a huge missed opportunity, and a significant setback in the 
peace process. 
C. A Serious Escalation 
On 28 December 2012, the Myanmar army launched attacks on a base near the KIO’s 
Laiza headquarters. This was not the first attack on the area since the resumption of 
hostilities in 2011, but this time it was backed by helicopter gunships and fighter jets. 
This was a serious escalation, as air power has rarely been used in Myanmar and 
appeared inconsistent with the president’s order not to take offensive actions. 
There is a large civilian population in and around Laiza, as well as a large number 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps. There were fears that any military 
offensive on the town would have a serious impact on civilians, and would likely 
send tens of thousands of refugees across the nearby border into China. IDP camps 
are situated on the approach roads to Laiza, and also at various locations in the town 
itself, including close to strategic targets. While in the end there was no attempt to 
capture Laiza, the possibility added to domestic and international concerns. 
The main target of air attacks was a hilltop military base (Hill 771), with no major 
civilian populations living nearby.35 The official New Light of Myanmar newspaper 
reported that the KIO had been using its position on this hill to attack the main 
Bhamo-Myitkyina road, including military ration supply convoys to the Myanmar 
army’s longstanding base at Lajayang, adjacent to Hill 771.36 The government said the 
KIO had been informed in advance that Myanmar military convoys would be passing 
along the route to deliver supplies, in order to prevent clashes from occurring, but 
that on all three occasions the KIO ambushed the convoys, with deadly effect.37 The 
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government stated that 35 of its soldiers died and 190 were wounded in these am-
bushes;38 while the KIO claimed to have killed 50 Myanmar army soldiers in one of 
these incidents alone.39  
The army subsequently launched an operation to take the hill in “self-defence” 
and used air cover as part of the assault, succeeding in its objective on 30 December.40 
It continued its operation, now backed up mainly by artillery rather than air power, 
taking other nearby posts, and overrunning the important KIO base Hka Ya Bum on 
26 January. According to some accounts, the Myanmar army lost 120 soldiers, with 
another 400 wounded, in the assault on this last position alone.41 
At this point, offensive operations by the military ceased. Sources close to the mili-
tary had been claiming since the start of the operation that there was no intention to 
take Laiza, and that the objective of the operations was to occupy the strategic high 
ground in the area, in order to protect existing military bases and their supply lines.42 
Part of the calculus was also likely to have been that control of these high points 
would give the military the ability to strike Laiza at will with artillery fire in response 
to offensive actions by the KIO.43 
The renewed fighting, particularly given its intensity, raised questions about the 
extent to which the president has authority over the armed forces, or about his own 
commitment to ending the Kachin conflict peacefully. The first halt to offensive 
actions called by the president in December 2011 (see above) did not end the conflict, 
but this was at least in part because it was not reciprocated by the KIO, which con-
tinued attacks on Myanmar army positions and state infrastructure, including major 
operations and ambushes that killed or injured scores of government soldiers. 
The second time that the president announced a halt to attacks was on 18 January, 
at the height of the operations around Laiza. The order applied only to the area around 
Lajayang, and in retrospect appears to have been aimed at reassuring China after a 
stray shell landed across the border the previous day (see below). The announce-
ment also came on the eve of a major gathering of international donors in Naypyitaw 
and just hours after the Myanmar legislature had passed a resolution urging an end 
to the fighting. 
The Myanmar military continued operations for a further week, until it had gained 
the upper hand by consolidating its hold of the strategic areas around Laiza, which 
seems likely to have been the original intention – although the military claims it 
abided by the president’s order and the continued fighting was the result of a KIO 
provocation.44 
It is not clear that there is any significant divergence between the president and 
the military, much less that the military is actively disobeying the president’s de-
crees. In a context where the military posts of the two sides are in many cases in close 
proximity, there is a high risk of clashes. The position of the military is that it was 
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willing to solve this issue through a separation of forces agreement, but that the KIO 
was not ready to have such a discussion, leaving only the military option on the table.45 
Whatever the merits of the Myanmar military’s version of events – which the KIO 
disputes (see above) – it seems clear that at a time when ceasefire negotiations were 
stalled, and when KIO attacks were causing Myanmar military casualties to mount, 
the president would have had difficulty preventing the military from taking action to 
secure its positions. The turning point seems to have been the failed 30 October 
2012 meeting and, whatever the real reason for that failure, the fact that Aung Min 
was left undermined vis-à-vis the military could well have reduced the latitude that 
the president felt he had to keep the military in check. 
V. The Search for Peace 
A. A Chinese Intervention 
It was China that broke the deadlock, by getting the Myanmar army and the KIO 
back to the negotiating table.46 
During the operations to secure the strategic high ground around Laiza, the Myan-
mar army made considerable use of artillery fire, with several shells falling on Laiza 
and three landing across the border in China on 30 December. No casualties were 
reported, but China issued a statement demanding that Myanmar “immediately take 
effective measures to prevent similar incidents from happening again”.47 
When a further stray shell landed across the border on 17 January 2013, China 
became more active. In addition to issuing an unusually strongly-worded statement 
expressing “strong concern and dissatisfaction with the situation, and demand[ing] 
that Myanmar earnestly investigate and adopt a series of measures to prevent fur-
ther similar occurrences”, China went on to call on “both sides involved in the con-
flict in Myanmar to … immediately implement a ceasefire … and jointly protect the 
peace and stability of the China-Myanmar border area”.48 This was the most pointed 
statement that it had made up to that point on the conflict and heralded a far more 
proactive stance. 
Two days later, on 19 January, a high-level Chinese delegation visited Naypyitaw 
and met with President Thein Sein. The delegation was headed by then-Vice Foreign 
Minister Fu Ying, but also included a senior military representative, Qi Jianguo, the 
deputy chief of the general staff, who also met separately with commander-in-chief 
Min Aung Hlaing.49 The main topic in both of these meetings was “border stability”, 
with China putting considerable pressure on Myanmar to end the fighting and find a 
peaceful solution, while also committing to use its influence on the KIO to do the 
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same.50 By late January, Myanmar army operations in Kachin ended, and on 1 Feb-
ruary the KIO issued a statement saying that they would end offensive military actions 
if the army did likewise.51 This was the first time, since the ceasefire broke down in 
2011, that the KIO had offered to stop fighting. 
Following this, there was a marked reduction in clashes. A hotline was established 
between the two sides, at a senior level (Lt-Gen Myint Soe, head of the Myanmar 
army’s bureau of special operations-1; and Maj-Gen Gun Maw, the KIO’s vice chief 
of staff). Hotlines are also in operation at lower levels. These have apparently been 
effective in preventing armed clashes from reoccurring.52 
On 4 February, a new round of peace talks was held in the Chinese border town of 
Ruili. Unlike previous meetings, the arrangements were made by China, who put sig-
nificant pressure on both sides to attend and provided explicit security guarantees for 
all participants. At the request of the KIO, two leaders of the Karen National Union 
armed group attended the talks as observers, as did representatives of the Shan State 
Army-South and prominent Shan individual Harn Yawnghwe.53 A senior official 
from the foreign ministry in Beijing – Ambassador Luo Zhaohui, director general for 
Asia – also attended the meeting, initially proposing to chair the talks, but accepting 
an observer role when both sides rejected his offer. China nevertheless became 
actively involved in the substance of the meeting, to the point of refusing to sign off 
on the agreed minutes unless mention of two issues that were discussed, humani-
tarian aid and ceasefire monitoring, was deleted.54 At the end of the meeting, the 
government and the KIO issued a joint statement agreeing to ease tensions and to 
hold further talks.55 
Subsequently, the Myanmar government held its first ever multiparty peace talks, 
having discussions on 20 February in the northern Thai city of Chiang Mai with the 
United Nationalities Federal Council umbrella group, which includes representatives 
of several ceasefire and non-ceasefire armed groups, including the KIO. The armed 
groups had been demanding such discussion for decades. The talks were also signifi-
cant for dealing with political issues, including key objectives for a dialogue, the pos-
sibility of developing a framework for political dialogue, and the need for a time-
frame.56 Apparently, China was keen to chair this meeting, but this was again rejected 
by both sides, and in the end Japan was invited to have the leading role – through the 
Nippon Foundation, which hosted and whose chairman, Yohei Sasakawa, was observ-
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er at the meeting.57 The day before the meeting, Sasakawa was appointed as “Special 
Envoy of the Government of Japan for National Reconciliation in Myanmar”.58 
The next bilateral talks between the government and the KIO were held from 11-
12 March 2013, again in the Chinese border town of Ruili. Once more, China played 
a very assertive role. Shortly prior to this meeting, it had appointed one of its top 
diplomats, Wang Yingfan, officially as “Special Envoy for Asian Affairs” but de facto 
as a Myanmar envoy.59 Wang is a seasoned foreign affairs specialist, having served 
as vice foreign minister and as China’s permanent representative to the UN in New 
York. He played a key role at the 11 March meeting, which some participants termed 
heavy-handed.60 Although, as with the February meeting, China was only an observ-
er, Wang interceded at several points, calling a halt to discussions and having private 
meetings with the principals.61  
In the final joint statement, both sides committed to working towards a durable 
ceasefire agreement, including monitoring arrangements, agreed on the importance 
of reaching a political settlement, and decided to meet again in April.62 Also present 
at the meeting were representatives of the United Nationalities Federal Council um-
brella group, and a number of individual armed groups – the Shan State Army-North, 
Shan State Army-South and National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla) – as well 
as the Kachin Peace Talk Creation Group. 
China’s intervention in these talks was far bolder than any role it has previously 
played in quieting tensions between the Myanmar government and armed groups.63 
When tensions peaked at the end of April 2010 between the government and several 
ethnic armed groups, many analysts – Chinese, Western and Myanmar – cited Bei-
jing’s mediation and pressure as a key factor in ensuring that tensions did not boil 
over.64 But on these occasions, pressure was exerted far more discreetly, through the 
expression of private concerns and pressure on both sides. Chinese analysts have 
remarked that the difference this time, in contrast to the past, is that China is medi-
ating in a more firm and more public fashion.65 
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Chinese diplomats have reaffirmed that the Kachin conflict is a domestic Myan-
mar issue, but one that can impact on China’s interests – its investment projects in 
Myanmar, and with regard to cross-border implications such as conflict spillover 
and possible refugee flows – and therefore that Beijing has a legitimate interest in its 
resolution.66 
China had initially been reluctant to involve itself in the Kachin conflict. Believing 
that Chinese involvement might help prevent the government from reneging on any 
deal reached, the Kachin attempted to gain Chinese backing in 2010 for a common 
peace proposal, but failed. In mid-2011, the KIO wrote to the Chinese government 
requesting that it be a neutral witness in the peace talks that followed the collapse of 
the ceasefire. China did not respond to this request,67 because, according to people 
close to Chinese government thinking, Beijing was cautious about giving official 
recognition to armed groups in Myanmar, which it felt any official response to such a 
request might do.68 
Beijing’s reluctance also reflected the lack of strong affinity between the Kachin 
and China. Although there are Kachin (Jingpo) in China’s Yunnan Province, their 
number – about 130,000 – is not enough to significantly shape central government 
policy. Unlike the Kokang who are ethnically Chinese and the Wa who have built 
close relations with China, the Kachin are predominantly Christian and seen as U.S.-
friendly.69 It was not until the cancellation of the Myitsone dam project in Kachin 
State in September 2011 that the Chinese were issued a wake-up call that their in-
vestments in Myanmar faced new political risk and uncertainty. The Kachin conflict 
greatly compounded this.  
China’s commercial interests have provided significant incentive for the govern-
ment to intervene. China’s greatest concern in Myanmar is over its energy corridor 
from Myanmar’s Indian Ocean port of Kyaukpyu, consisting of twin pipelines to im-
port natural gas and crude oil. The pipelines are important for meeting the border 
province of Yunnan’s growing energy needs, and critical for China’s broader energy 
security, by providing an alternative route to the congested and strategically vulner-
able Straits of Malacca.70 These pipelines, which were completed in early June and 
are due to begin operation this year, pass close to KIO-held areas in northern Shan 
State where armed clashes have occurred. Ensuring the smooth operation of the pipe-
lines is a top priority of both Beijing and the provincial government in Kunming, 
particularly following the Myitsone dam cancellation.71 
Several other factors are also responsible for China’s decision to intervene so 
assertively: 
Border stability. While the immediate trigger for the shift in Chinese policy appears 
to have been the stray shells falling over the border in December 2012 and January 
2013, a key worry for China was the possibility of a government assault on Laiza, the 
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fall of which would have serious implications for border security.72 In addition, 
memories are still fresh of the large and unforeseen influx of refugees – some 40,000 
– from a conflict in Myanmar’s Kokang region in 2009, and of the potential for an 
even larger influx from Kachin areas.73 
Geostrategic issues.  Some observers have noted that the shift in China’s approach 
came shortly after the U.S. ambassador to Myanmar visited Kachin State in Decem-
ber 2012, along with rumours that the U.S. might be intending to play a mediation 
role – something that the KIO had been calling for.74 Given the geostrategic rivalry 
between the U.S. and China in the region, the prospect of Washington becoming in-
volved in an issue on China’s border may have galvanised a more proactive response 
from Beijing.75 (For its part, the U.S. says that it has been very cautious about becom-
ing directly involved in the issue, even if it were invited to do so by both parties, due 
to Chinese sensitivities.76) 
Nationalist pressure. Another factor is the nationalistic reaction of segments of the 
Chinese public, who have expressed unhappiness with some of Myanmar’s actions 
towards China – including the cancellation of the Myitsone dam, difficulties with 
other Chinese investment projects (such as the Letpadaung copper mine), refugee 
flows, and the stray shells landing in China. This created pressure on the Chinese 
government to adopt a stronger stance.77 There were also small protests by Chinese 
Kachin demanding that Beijing put pressure on Myanmar to end its offensive.78 
The geostrategic concerns should not be underestimated as China has demonstrated 
an almost allergic reaction to international involvement in the Kachin peace process. 
In the 4 February meeting, it vetoed any mention in the minutes of humanitarian 
assistance and ceasefire monitoring arrangements, the two issues that might have 
involved an international presence on its border. It also tried to prevent Harn Yawn-
ghwe – who is the son of the first president of Burma – from attending the meeting 
on the grounds that he heads the Euro-Burma Office, saying that this was an “inter-
national NGO”.79 On this latter point it was overruled by the Myanmar government 
and the KIO.80 In the 11 March meeting, China reportedly objected to the inclusion 
in the joint statement of a sentence agreed between the parties that noted the im-
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portance of having the participation of respected (and by implication, international) 
observers at future meetings.81 
Following the 11 March meeting, a deadlock ensued in arranging the next talks, 
which were to have taken place on 6 April. The KIO had invited international observ-
ers (the U.S., UK and UN), but this was effectively vetoed by China. Beijing informed 
the KIO ahead of the planned meeting – which was to have taken place in the Kachin 
State capital Myitkyina – that it did not support the group’s participation in talks at 
which such international observers were present.82 Given the KIO’s reluctance to go 
against China’s wishes, it withdrew from the meeting. This prompted criticism of 
China from Kachin civil society, which claimed that its position was an obstacle to 
progress in the peace talks, a view that was widely echoed in the domestic Myanmar 
media.83 
Eventually, a compromise was worked out, with the government and KIO meet-
ing in Myitkyina from 28-30 May, with China and the UN as the only international 
observers.84 The U.S. and UK stayed away. China dropped its initial insistence that 
no international observers (including the UN) could be present partly because it was 
worried by the negative perception of its role in the Myanmar talks, precisely at a 
time when improving its damaged image in the country was a priority.85 It remains 
opposed to any U.S. or UK involvement, but changed its stance on UN participation 
as it has begun to consider a proposal to guarantee the implementation of the peace 
agreement under a UN framework. A Chinese analyst explained that Beijing expects 
high-level Chinese presence in any UN delegation “so it will not be beyond our con-
trol”, but remains concerned that if the U.S. or UK were separately involved it could 
lose control of the situation.86 
As part of the compromise arrangement, the KIO had sought and received U.S. and 
UK assurances that, although not observers at the May 2013 talks, they would “con-
tinue to follow developments closely”.87 This diplomatic support for the peace pro-
cess is important to the KIO, as it seeks ways to ensure that agreements reached are 
actually implemented. It is particularly relevant given that there was very little inter-
national focus on or support for the ceasefire process in the 1990s, when global at-
tention was mainly on democracy and Aung San Suu Kyi – widely seen in retrospect 
as a significant missed opportunity.88 The level of attention now being given to the 
ethnic issue by the U.S., UK and broader international community is unprecedented. 
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B. Prospects for a Lasting Solution 
The latest round of peace talks produced a significant step forward. On 30 May, the 
government and the KIO signed a seven-point agreement in the presence of witness-
es that included representatives of the UN, China and eight ethnic armed groups.89 
The two sides agreed to: 
 move forward with a political dialogue; 
 take steps to achieve “de-escalation and cessation of hostilities”; 
 establish joint monitoring committees; 
 undertake relief, rehabilitation and resettlement of internally displaced persons; 
 continue discussions on repositioning of troops; 
 establish a KIO technical team in the Kachin State capital Myitkyina to facilitate 
more effective peace discussions; and 
 invite the same group of observers to attend the next meeting, with any addition-
al observers being invited only after consultation between the parties. 
The agreement was careful to avoid explicit mention of the term “ceasefire”, which 
for the KIO and the Kachin public has very negative connotations given the failures 
of the 1994 process. However, this agreement is a ceasefire in all but name. It con-
firms a de facto cessation of hostilities that has held, apart from minor skirmishes, 
since 1 February 2013. The agreement incorporates three concerns that have long 
been key for the KIO: that separation of forces is required to reduce the potential for 
clashes; that a monitoring and verification mechanism is critical for preventing and 
addressing ceasefire violations; and that a dialogue on the underlying political issues 
is key to ensuring a sustainable end to the conflict. A follow-up meeting between the 
two sides is expected within a few weeks, possibly in late June, at which a further 
agreement could be signed. 
Continued peace in Kachin depends on further progress in these three areas. More 
detailed negotiations will be required, alongside a broader multiparty political dia-
logue on ethnic aspirations and grievances. The 30 May agreement should be seen as 
the beginning of a process of consolidating peace, not as the end. This is important 
because a resumption of armed conflict is all too possible, and is probably more likely 
in Kachin than in many other ceasefire areas due to the high levels of distrust and 
recent intense fighting. 
While international participation and diplomatic support are critical to consoli-
dating the peace process, the parties must take external geopolitical rivalries into 
account, to avoid these being imported into the Myanmar context. Beijing is resolute 
about continuing to block any substantive involvement of the U.S. or UK in what it 
sees as an issue relating to its border security.90 In this context, China’s relative open-
ness to a UN framework should be encouraged and fully utilised. 
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Beyond these considerations, there are a number of other issues that need to be 
addressed, including humanitarian access to allow the provision of essential assis-
tance to populations displaced as a result of the conflict. The government needs to be 
more proactive in facilitating this. 
It is also critical to address the longer-term development needs of Kachin com-
munities. This will require donor assistance, but most importantly, it calls for a shift 
in the nature of the economy in Kachin areas, from the present conflict economy to 
one that provides broad benefits to Kachin State and its peoples. 
The former ceasefire economy in the period 1994-2011 did not do this. The end to 
the fighting created a security context in which large-scale economic projects were 
able to be carried out, but the lack of any political settlement meant that uncertainty 
remained and the focus continued to be on resource extraction. The military gov-
ernment gave some economic concessions to armed group leaders, but made few 
efforts to integrate the borderlands into the national economy, which was in any case 
dominated by rent-seeking and monopolistic practices. Most projects in Kachin were 
extractive in nature – jade and gold mining, and logging – and involved illegal activi-
ties such as gambling and smuggling. There was little regulation from the KIO, who 
needed revenues to finance its operations and maintain its army, and some of its 
leaders were profiting greatly from these activities.91 The Kachin population saw very 
little benefits, and significant environmental degradation negatively impacted on 
livelihoods. The international community provided very little support for develop-
ment efforts. 
A new political economy of peace needs to develop. This will not be easy, and recent 
experience from other ceasefire areas gives cause for concern.92 Kachin State has 
great natural resource wealth, and risks are high that exploitation of these resources 
will remain largely unregulated – involving land grabs, clear-felling watersheds and 
pollution. The sale of jade – all of which is mined in Kachin State – is estimated to 
have reached as much as $10 billion annually, which would make it by far Myan-
mar’s largest export commodity.93 While Kachin businessmen and the KIO make a 
lot of money from this trade, the largest profits go to non-Kachin business interests, 
including allegedly many of the largest private companies in Myanmar.94 Given the 
vast sums of money at stake and the extent of the informal trade, regulating the sec-
tor, guaranteeing transparency and ensuring that a share of revenues is reinvested 
in Kachin State will not be easy. It is hard to be optimistic about a sustainable peace 
unless communities, and the Kachin State economy as a whole, benefit from its 
resource bonanza. 
Notwithstanding the enormous challenges, there are also reasons to be hopeful. 
This new agreement has come at a time of unprecedented political and economic re-
form in Myanmar. The economy is becoming more open and transparent, and there 
are opportunities for the Kachin State economy to integrate with the national economy, 
 
 
91 For a detailed analysis, see Tom Kramer, op. cit. 
92 See “Developing disparity: regional investment in Burma’s borderlands”, Transnational Institute 
and Burma Centre Netherlands, February 2013; and “Losing ground: land conflicts and collective 
action in eastern Myanmar”, Karen Human Rights Group, March 2013. 
93 See “Against the odds: Building a coalition. Using a new federalism for unity and progress in My-
anmar”, Harvard Kennedy School and Rajawali Foundation, March 2013; and Renaud Egreteau, 
“Jade or JADE? Debating international sanctions on Burma’s gem industry”, East-West Center, 
Asia-Pacific Bulletin, no. 132, 13 October 2011. 
94 Crisis Group interviews, individuals with detailed knowledge of the jade trade, Yangon, May 
2013. 
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and take advantage of its proximity to China and India. The possibility of revenue-
sharing agreements for the ethnic states is on the cards. There is also a new genera-
tion of KIO leaders at the helm, who are more politically dynamic and who do not 
appear to be giving priority solely to economic interests. When combined with more 
open electoral politics, there is hope that they may prioritise the interests of Kachin 
communities, among which support for the KIO is at an all-time high. 
VI. Conclusion 
Reaching a peace agreement between the government and the KIO has been one of 
the biggest challenges of the overall ethnic peace process. This has been due to high 
levels of mutual distrust after the previous ceasefire broke down less than two years 
ago, leading to a resumption of often intense fighting. 
The deal that has now been struck is a major step forward, but securing a sustain-
able peace will require much more work. Detailed agreements are still needed on 
complex and contentious issues such as force separation and monitoring and verifi-
cation mechanisms. A dialogue process addressing underlying political grievances 
also needs to begin. 
An end to the conflict is crucial for relief, rehabilitation and development initiatives 
to begin, but peace brings with it new risks for the people of Kachin State. Recent 
experience from ceasefires in other parts of Myanmar points to a potential increase 
in land grabs and exploitative and environmentally damaging resource extraction 
activities. This is a particular risk in Kachin State, given its enormously valuable 
natural resources. 
The context is very different from the last ceasefire agreed by the KIO in 1994. 
This new agreement comes after a period of unprecedented political and economic 
reform in the country. If more far-sighted decisions are taken this time around by the 
central government, the KIO and Kachin civic leaders, a more sustainable peace econ-
omy could emerge that would distribute greater economic and social benefits to com-
munities. But before this peace dividend can be claimed, many difficult underlying 
political issues need to be resolved. In short, there is not yet any guarantee of success. 
Yangon/Jakarta/Brussels, 12 June 2013 
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Appendix A: Map of Myanmar 
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